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In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho 
372 6 
TREVOR JAMES BOOTH, ) 
) 
Peti ti oner-Respondent, ) ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 
) AUGMENT THE RECORD 
v. ) 
) Supreme Court Docket No. 37296-2010 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) Canyon County Docket No. 2006-8651 
) 
Respondent -Appellant. ) 
A MOTION TO AUGMENT THE RECORD AND STATEMENT IN SUPPORT 
THEREOF was filed by counsel for Appellant on June 11,2010. Therefore, good cause appearing, 
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that Appellant's MOTION TO AUGMENT THE RECORD be, 
and hereby is, GRANTED and the augmentation record shall include the document listed below, 
file stamped copies of which accompanied this Motion: 
1. Order Denying Motion for Reconsideration, file-stamped April 27, 2010. 
t'-
DATED this J7- day ofJune 2010. 
F or the Supreme Court 
gtVf~~W 
Stephen W. Kenyon, Cl k 
cc: Counsel of Record 
\\~08-455-5955 
~J \' 
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CANYON COUNTY 
I 
IN THE DISTRlCT COURt OF THE TIDRD JUDICIAL DISTRlCT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, fN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
TREVOR JAMES BOOTH, I) CASE NO. CV-06-08651 
) 
VS. 













ORDER DENYING MOTION 
FOR RECONSIDERATION 
The above-entitled cause preViout came before the Court as a trial on Trevor Booth's 
I 
Petition for Post Conviction Relief. On December 1, 2009, this Court entered its Findings of 
Fact,. Conclusions of Law and Order Or ting Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. The state 
filed a Motion to Reconsider pursuant ,0 LR.C.P 11(a)(2)(B) on December 9, 2009. The 
petitioner filed his responsive brief on March 1, 2009. No reply was filed by the state. The 
Court will decide this matter without oral ~gument. . 
The main underlying determinatior of this Court in its decision was that defense counsel 
fell below an objective standard of rea~onableness in one area of his representation of the 
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case in which the state also filed a requ st that the jury be asked to. determine whether certain 
statutory "aggravating circumstances," referenced in I.C. § 18-4004 (which establishes the 
punishment for murder) existed. l Boot's defense counsel advised him that if he went to trial 
and the jury found him guilty of First De ree Murder and also found the existence of one of the 
statutory aggravating circumstances, the udge would be required to sentence him to a fixed life 
sentence. Upon considering that advice Booth decided to plead guilty to the charge of First 
Degree Murder in exchange for the s ate dropping its pursuit of a statutory aggravating 
circumstance. 
I 
Standarr for Reconsideration 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 11 (1)(2)(B) provides: 
A motion for reconsideration 0lany interlocutory orders of the trial court may 
be made at any time before the en ry of final judgment but not later than fourteen 
(14) days after the entry of the fi al judgment. A motion for reconsideration of 
any order of the trial court made ~er entry of final judgment may be filed within 
fourteen (14) days from the entrpr of such order; provided, there shall be no 
motion for reconsideration of 'ttl order of the trial C01l..rt entered on any 
motion filed under Rules 50(a), 52fb), 55(c), 59(a), 59(e), 59.l, 60(a), or 60(b). 
Turning to the specific motion a~ hand, "[t]he decision to grant or deny a request for 
reconsideration generally rests in the SO~d discretion of the trial court." Jordan v. Beeks, 135 
Idaho 586, 592, 21 P.3d 908, 914 (2001)1 The trial court must: (1) perceive the issue as one of 
discretion; (2) act within the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the legal 
standards applicable to the specific choJes available to it; and (3) reach its decision by an 
I 
exercise ofreason. Lettunich v. Lettunich, 145 Idaho 746, 749, 185 P.3d 258,261 (2008); Indian 
Springs LLC v. Indian Springs Land Inv'J Le, 215 P.3d 457,469 (2009). 
The enumerated "aggravating circurnstan s" are reflected in I.e. § 19-2515. 
ORDER DENYING MOTION 
FOR RECONSIDERATION 
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Standard for In ffective Assistance of Counsel 
In Strickland v. Washington, 466Iu.s. 668 (1984), the U.S. Supreme Court articulated a 
two-part test to be employed in reviewin claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. First, the 
defendant must prove that his attome 's performance fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness. fd at 688. Second, if e reviewing court fmds that the defendant can prove 
counsel's performance was constitutiona ly ineffective, then the defendant must prove that the 
deficient performance resulted in prejudLe. In Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985), the U.S. 
Supreme Court further clarified Strickla d in cases involving guilty pleas to require a showing 
that there was "a reasonable probability hat, but for his attorney's errors, the defendant would 
not have pleaded guilty and would have nsisted on going to trial." See Ray v. State, 136 Idaho 
96, 982 P.2d 931 (1999). 
Analysis 
In its Motion to Reconsider, the tate presents three arguments. First, I.C. §18-8004 is 
"patently clear: a fixed life sentence is r quired when aggravated circumstances are found in a 
non-capital case ... " Second, that even ir the actual advice was wrong, defense counsel acted 
reasonably. Third, Booth failed to pre,ent any evidence to satisfy the second prong of the 
Strickland test; that is, the evidence did nil t show he would have been acquitted, receive a lesser-
included offense, or a lighter sentence. 
1. It is not patently clear that a ifIxed life sentence is mandatory in a non-capital 
murder case. Rather, the st te's position that the defendant must receive a 
mandatory :fIXed life sentence if jury finds an aggravating circumstance in a non-
capital First Degree Murder cas is a statutory impossibility. 
With regard to the fIrst argument, i· is not patently clear that a fixed life sentence is 
required in a non-capital case. Idaho Cod § 18-8004 provides: 
Subject to the provisions of sectio s 19-2515 and 19-2515A, Idaho Code, every 
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person guilty of murder of the lrst degree shall be punished by death or by 
_______ --!llHmlFPlHriSQIlIDent-fGI-life,-p· ai-a-sentence-Gf-ooath-shall-not-b@-imlDpe:osSte:edc--------
unless the prosecuting attorney lled written notice of intent to seek the death 
penalty as required under the pr visions of section 18-4004A, Idaho Code, and 
provided further that whenever le death penalty is not imposed the court shall 
impose a sentence. If a jury, or e court if a jury is waived, fInds a statutory 
aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt but finds that the imposition 
of the death penalty would be unjlUst, the court shall impose a fixed life sentence. 
I 
If a jury, or the court if a jury i$ waived, does not find a statutory aggravating 
circumstance beyond a reasonablF doubt or if the death penalty is not sought, 
the court shall impose a life sentence with a minimum period of confinement 
of not less than ten (10) years ting which period of confmement the offender 
shall not be eligible for parole or discharge or credit or reduction of sentence for 
good conduct, except for merito ous service. Every person guilty of murder of 
the second degree is punishable b~ imprisonment not less than ten (10) years and 
the imprisonment may extend to liffe. (Emphasis added). 
This Court agrees with the state tat the statute is clear and unambiguous, and that the 
I 
words must be given their plain, usual, ld ordinary meaning. In this case, however, it is clear 
that the foregoing statute provides that Ihere the death penalty is not sought in a First Degree 
Murder case, the sentencing Court shall ifPose a life sentence with a minimum fixed period of 
ten years. I 
In addition, 1. C. § 19-251 5 sets foih the statutory aggravating factors the state references 
in its motion. The Court first notes that the statute is entitled: SENTENCE IN CAPITAL 
CASES -- SPECIAL SENTENCING ROCEEDING -- STATIJTORY AGGRAVATING 
CIRCUMSTANCES -- SPECIAL VERn CT OR WRITTEN FINDINGS. Subsection (5)(a) 
provides: 
If a erson is ad'udicated I il of murder in the fIrst de fee, whether by 
acceptance of a plea of guilty, by erdict of a jury, or by decision of the trial court 
sitting without a jury, and a noticb of intent to seek the death penalty was filed 
and served as provided in sectioll 18-4004A, Idaho Code, a special sentencing 
proceeding shall be held promptly or the purpose of hearing all relevant evidence 
and arguments of counsel in aggra ation and mitigation of the offense, 
(emphasis added). Based upon the fOregoJg, it is clear that only in cases in which 1) a person 
ORDER DENYING MOTION 
FOR RECONSIDERATION 
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has been adjudicated guilty of First Degr e Murder, 2) a notice of intent to seek the death penalty 
had previously been filed, and 3) a speci 1 sentencing proceeding is held at which the statutory 
aggravating circumstances are presented d found to exist, and only in that event, is the Court 
I 
required to issue a fixed life sentence.2 
2. Despite the fact that defens counsel vigorously and diligently pursued his 
representation of Mr. Booth, hi performance in this one area fell below an objective 
standard of reasonableness. 
I 
The state's next argument, that f'defense counsel's performance did not fall below an 
objective standard of reasonableness, g es to the first prong of the Strickland test, set forth 
above. This objective standard embraces a strong presumption that the claimant's counsel was 
competent and diligent. More simply puf' "the standard for evaluating attorney performance is 
objective reasonableness under preVailinr professional norms." Schoger v. Stat, 226 P.3d 1269 
(February 1, 2010)(citing State v. Mathfws, 133 Idaho 300, 306, 986 P.2d 323, 329 (1999». 
Trial counsel's tactical decisions will justify relief if the decision is shown to have resulted from 
inadequate preparation, ignorance of the ~elevant law or other shortcomings capable of objective 
review." Howard v. State, 126 Idaho 231, 233,880 P.2d 261, 263 (Ct.App.l994), State v. Payne, 
146 Idaho 548, 561, 199 P.3d 123, 136 (2008); Barcella v. State, 224 P.3d 536, 544 (Ct.App. 
2009) McKayv. State, 225 P.3d 700, 703 (2010). 
I 
At the time the murder case wJ filed against Booth, the death penalty provisions of 
Idaho law had been modified relatively rtcently (2003) to comply with the U.S Supreme Court 
case of Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 602, 609, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002), which 
required a jury determination of the dea penalty sentencing factors. The amendment to the 
2 Of course, the fixed life sentence is mandjtoIY only if death has been removed as a sentence pursuant to 
I.e. § 19-2515(7)(b). 
ORDER DENYING MOTION 5 
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statute included the new language to § 18 4004 that is at issue in this case.3 
A lawyer does not meet the obje tively reasonable standard if, while advising a client to 
take a plea offer, he fails to apprise his c~ent of the likely sentence by making a plainly incorrect 
I 
estimate due to his ignorance of the appltcable law of which he should have been aware. Us. v. 
Anderson, 2010 WL 1458858, 7 (D.D.C!201O), (citing United States v. Booze, 293 F.3d 516, 
518 (D.C.Cir.2002); see also United Silates v. Hanso~, 339 F.3d 983, 990 (D.C.Cir.2003). 
Furthermore, lawyers must be familiar w th the federal sentencing guidelines in order to provide 
effective representation in federal cajes. United Slates v. McCoy, 215 F.3d 102, 108 
(D.C.Cir.2000». I 
It appears that part of the state's rrgument is that even if defense counsel's advice was 
incorrect, such advice was objectively re~sonable under the circumstances. In support of this 
position, the state notes that both the ProsLution and defense counsel were highly experienced in 
the field of criminal law, yet they shared the same interpretation of the statute. Further, both 
. I 
I 
counsel reasonably believed that this f0urt, as presiding judge in the murder case, also 
interpreted the statute to be consistent W
f
' ith both counsels' interpretation, and that counsel's 
advice to Mr. Booth was partially based 0' that understanding. 
The facts of the McCoy case, supr( are similar to this case. In that case, the Court held 
that counsel's performance was consti~tionallY deficient even though defense counsel's 
miscalculation of the applicable sentenc~g range was reinforced by the prosecutor, and more 
I 
importantly, the court never informed MCfOY of the maximum statutory penalty. See also, Us. 
v. Macon,91 Fed. Appx. 239, 244 (c.A.13 CPa.) 2004),4 (McCoy case distinguished on these 
facts). Therefore, even if both counsel a~d the Court misinterpreted the statutory language in 
S.L. 2003, ch. 19, § 1. 
(Not selected for publication in the ederal Reporter, NO. 02-3520) 
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question, advising a client of that the pourt would have no discretion other than to issue a 
mandatory fixed life sentence, when sulh is not the law, falls below an objective standard of 
reasonableness. I 
3. The state has misstated the apJUcable legal standard applicable to the second part 
of the Strickland standard. l 
Finally, the state argues that the vidence did not show the defendant would have been 
I 
acquitted, receive a lesser-included offe~se, or a lighter sentence. This argument assumes a 
misstatement of the law. When assertinglineffective assistance of counsel with regard to a guilty 
plea. a defendant does not need to establi~h that the result of his case would have been different; 
I 
rather, he must establish that, but for co~nsel's deficient perfonnance, he would not have pled 
guilty and would have insisted on going t trial. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985) Dunlap v. 
State, 141 Idaho 50,59, 106 P.3d 376, 3r (2004); Gilpin-Grubb v. State, 138 Idaho 76, 82, 57 
P.3d 787, 793 (2002); McKeeth v. State, rr40 Idaho 847, 851, 103 P.3d 460, 464 (2004); Ray v. 
State, 133 Idaho 96, 101, 983 P.2d 9311' 936 (1999); Ridgley v. State, 2010 WL 936091, 4 
(March 17,2010). I 
The Court's Finding of Fact Number 29 reflects: 
Although Trevor Booth's teltimony in the peR case lacked a significant 
level of credibility, Richard Harris' testimony was virtually unimpeachable. His 
testimony establishes that there is J reasonable probability that, but for his opinion 
and advice that I.e. §18-4004 pro~ides for a mandatory fixed life sentence in a 
non-capital first degree murder c~se if a statutory aggravating circumstance is 
proven, the defendant would not ave pled guilty and would have either insisted 
on going to trial andlor continued t pursue some other plea agreement. 
I 
At a minimum, this testimony and jrecord before the Court was sufficient to establish the 
requisite prejudice. I 
After carefully considering the ar~ents presented by the state and the petitioner, as 
I 
well as the record in its entirety, and for tie reasons set forth above and in the Findings ofFoc!, 
ORDER DENYING MOTION I 7 
FOR RECONSIDERATION I 
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I 
Conclusions of Law and Order Granting ~etition for Post-Conviction Relief entered December 1, 
----~--2-0-0-9-, th-e state's Motion to Reconsider islHEREBY DENIED. 
Dated this '~ay of April, 2010, 




·208-455-5955 Line 1 
I 
I 
08:23:57 a.m. 06-08-2010 
CERTIF~CATE OF SERVICE: 
The undersigned does hereby certify that ~e an;correct copy of the foregoing document was 
served by the following method indicated below to each of the following: 
Ty Ketlinski II 
Canyon County Prosecuting Attorney 
Canyon County Courthouse i 
1115 Albany St. 
Caldwell,ID 83605 
___ u. S. Mail, postage prepaid 
___ Telecopy/fax 
)( Personally delivered 
Van Bishop 
203 12th Ave. Rd, Suite B 
Nampa,ID 83686 
___ U. S. Mail, postage prepaid 
___ Telecopy/fax 
Y Personally delivered 
ORDER DENYING MOTION 
FOR RECONSIDERATION 
111 ~ DATED this 27 day of, 2010 . 
.. 
ditltlJJ4 !c!;Lt!t~ 
Deputy Clerk 
9 
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